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ABSTRACT 
Anti-Semitism, as an ancient and subtle ethnic and religious discrimination, is the 
precursor for more violent forms of biases that manifest themselves in today’s newer 
generations as a need for nationalism, opposed to a unified Europe. Anti-Semitism, 
among other discriminations, is a deviation from the shared values that the Western 
European nations agreed to uphold through the supranational organizations of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). How does anti-
Semitism among member states affect these organizations and what does that mean in the 
grand scheme of stability and security in Europe? If the democratic member states of 
NATO and the EU cannot count on the inclusive, tolerant, democratic rhetoric of their 
populations or enforce the value systems that they established, the security of Europe is 
in danger.  This thesis examines these issues in the context of Poland (a newer member of 
both organizations) and Germany (a founding member of both organizations), with an 
eye toward the past and present of anti-Semitism in each state and the future of the 
leading principles of these regional/supranational organizations. 
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Anti-Semitism, as an ancient and subtle ethnic and religious discrimination, is the 
precursor for more violent forms of biases that manifest themselves in today’s newer 
generations as a need for nationalism, opposed to a unified Europe. Anti-Semitism, among 
other discriminations, is a deviation from the shared values that the Western European 
nations agreed to uphold through the supranational organizations of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). How does anti-Semitism 
among member states affect these organizations and what does that mean in the grand 
scheme of stability and security among Europe? Anti-Semitism acts as a warning for bad 
things to come, like the proverbial canary in the coal mine. If the democratic member states 
of NATO and the EU cannot count on the inclusive, tolerant, democratic rhetoric of their 
populations or enforce the value systems to which they established, the security of Europe 
is in danger. This thesis examines these issues in the context of Poland (a newer member 
of both organizations) and Germany (a founding member of both organizations), with an 
eye toward the past and present of anti-Semitism in each state and the future of the leading 
principles of these regional/supranational organizations.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Provided the complex and critical stability and security frameworks among 
European nations and the value systems to which they depend, this thesis askes the 
following question: What are the ramifications of anti-Semitism in democratic European 
societies and governments, through the case studies of Poland and Germany, and how does 
it affect NATO and the EU?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
At the very least, anti-Semitism contradicts the foundational values of 
contemporary Europe—which, in turn, imperils European and Western security. Security 
in Europe can never be separated from the most fundamental issues of human rights. An 
important definition for this analysis is that of human rights, specifically international 
human rights. The EU defines human rights the same as the United Nations (UN) and 
2 
strongly presses its member states along with partners in trade or other dealings to uphold 
the same values.1 These UN human rights are international norms according to which the 
EU as well as NATO pull their definition, while incorporating them into the value system 
of democratic states.2 
The UN defines human rights in a series of thirty articles, where, as stated on the 
UN website, the General Assembly 
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every 
individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in 
mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights 
and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure 
their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the 
peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories 
under their jurisdiction.3 
The UN defines Rule of Law as “a principle of governance in which all persons, 
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to 
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and 
which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.”4 
The rule of law also comes from the UN definition from which NATO and the EU 
draw their shared values.5 Specifically, NATO identifies the rule of law as a principle that 
all members must uphold and defend. NATO is committed to the rule of law definition as 
the UN articulates it.6 Article 2 of the Washington Treaty states, according to the Atlantic 
 
1 Marika Lerch, “Human Rights,” European Parliament, September 2020, 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/165/human-rights. 
2 Lerch. 
3 “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, April 18, 2021, 
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights. 
4 Eric Doss, “What Is the Rule of Law,” United Nations and the Rule of Law, April 5, 2021, 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/. 
5 “Relations with the European Union,” NATO, February 15, 2021, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm. 
6 “NATO’s Purpose,” NATO, September 24, 2020, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm. 
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council website, the NATO member states will “contribute toward the further development 
of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by 
bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are 
founded,” reinforcing UN preambles.7  
The European Commission defines the Rule of law as follows: “The rule of law 
includes principles such as legality, implying a transparent, accountable, democratic and 
pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal certainty; prohibiting the arbitrary exercise of 
executive power; effective judicial protection by independent and impartial courts, 
effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights; separation of powers; 
and equality before the law.”8 
Any quick glance at the founding documents in which the core principles of the 
Washington treaty of 1949, or the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009, quickly indicates that 
democracy equals human rights, and they are indeed at the heart of both supranational 
organizations.9 
1. NATO 
NATO was established in 1949 by 12 founding countries.10 NATO now has 30 
member states, adding North Macedonia in 2020.11 According to NATO’s website, NATO 
was established to “safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and 
 
7 Damon Wilson and Will O’Brien, “Reimagine the Washington Treaty,” Atlantic Council, October 
14, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/nato20-2020/reimagine-the-washington-treaty/. 
8 “2020 Rule of Law Report -Questions and Answers,” European Commission, September 30, 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_1757. 
9 European Parliament, “Treaty of Lisbon,” European Parliament in plain language, accessed May 6, 
2021, https://europarlamentti.info/en/European-union/treaty/treaty-of-Lisbon/; Wilson and O’Brien, 
“Reimagine the Washington Treaty”; “NATO in History: Purpose and Evolution,” CGTN, February 15, 
2015, https://news.cgtn.com/news/316b444e33677a6333566d54/share_p.html; “NATO’s Purpose”; “The 
History of the European Union,” European Union, June 16, 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/history_en. 
10 “NATO in History.” 
11 “NATO on the Map,” NATO, December 27, 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato-on-the-
map/#lat=51.72673918960763&lon=4.84911701440904&zoom=0&layer-1&infoBox=Poland; “NATO in 
History.” 
4 
military means.”12 Its purpose changed after the fall of the Soviet Union, as it redefined its 
goals following the 1991 Rome Summit through a new strategic concept developing 
cooperation and opening options for expanding membership.13 The true significance 
comes from the nationalism which gave rise to the world wars, armed to dismantle 
democracy and which go against human rights. The need to counter such armed 
nationalism is the key in defending democracy, human rights, and the rule of law— the 
shared values of NATO and the EU for all member states and beyond. 
2. EU 
The EU was created in 1993 by six founding countries, France, Italy, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, and West Germany, through uniting their steel and coal 
communities; this linkage of the European nations politically and economically promised 
to secure a lasting peace.14 It currently has 27 members and many aspiring members 
including Turkey.15  
The history of the Holocaust and the trauma associated with the genocide have left 
lasting impressions on the generations in Europe, and anti-Semitism affects the EU and EU 
member states in many ways. Notably, Roman Prodi, a former president of the EU, 
exclaimed that all EU states must fight against all manifestations of racism, anti-Semitism, 
and xenophobia.16  
Internal issues within the union itself have caused rifts, endangering the union’s 
stability and authority at its core. In 2004, Prodi, while in his presidential capacity, was 
accused of anti-Semitism by Jewish world leaders for censorship he imposed on an EU-
sponsored study that claimed European Muslims were largely responsible for attacks on 
 
12 “NATO’s Purpose.” 
13 “NATO in History.” 
14 “The History of the European Union.” 
15 “About the EU,” European Union, June 16, 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu_en. 
16 J.M. Peck, Being Jewish in the New Germany (Rutgers University Press, 2005), 
https://books.google.com/books?id=ZYhtWcKp2QEC. 
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Jews, and also for cancelling an anti-Semitism conference, swiftly reinstating the event 
upon receiving word of such accusations.17 Whether these claims were accurate or anti-
Semitism was used as a tool to alter decisions in favor of the Jewish community, anti-
Semitism is a key factor in how the EU makes decisions, manages its member states, and 
projects itself around the world.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholars are unable to agree on a precise definition of anti-Semitism, and often rely 
on examples to define it.18 Lipstadt explains that anti-Semitism can be seen as an attitude 
and cannot be measured in numbers of recorded anti-Semitic actors or by numbers of 
people categorized as anti-Semites.19 If one looks at anti-Semitism as an attitude—Jewish 
hatred will exist, like all attitudes—this view will be seen in different intensity levels and 
in different shades.20  These different levels are displayed throughout history from what 
scholars believe to be anti-Semitism’s origins. In this thesis, anti-Semitism is characterized 
as an attitude and a bias that influences European societies and governments, which will 
be examined in hopes of addressing its ramifications in today’s Europe. This section 
provides a review of a portion of the abundant scholarship established surrounding the 
topic of anti-Semitism and how Jews in Europe have lived with a constant hatred against 
them, never being seen as part of any community, group, or nation state until the 
establishment of Israel and even then, their own nation is still seen as an outcast. Something 
 
17 Peck, 113. 
18 Deborah E. Lipstadt, Antisemitism: Here and Now, First edition (New York: Schocken Books, 
2019), 12; “Defining Anti-Semitism,” United States Department of State (blog), accessed May 19, 2021, 
https://www.state.gov/defining-anti-semitism/; “Definition of Antisemitism,” European Commission, 
accessed May 19, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-
discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/combating-antisemitism/definition-antisemitism_en; Tim Anderson, 
“What’s Wrong with the IHRA ‘Working Definition’ of Anti-Semitism?,” TheAltWorld (blog), January 29, 
2020, https://thealtworld.com/tim_anderson/whats-wrong-with-the-ihra-working-definition-of-anti-
semitism; Peter G. J. Pulzer and Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany & Austria 
(Harvard University Press, 1988). 
19 Lipstadt, Antisemitism, A Note to Reader. 
20 L. Daniel Staetsky, “Antisemitism in Contemporary Great Britain: A Study of Attitudes towards 
Jews and Israel” (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, September 2017), 3–5. 
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to be feared as the Other who threatens other nations. The Jews have played the role as the 
scape goat for countless non-Jewish communities throughout the centuries and has not 
stopped even after the Holocaust. New forms of hatred against the Jews still press against 
democratic values established on the principle of stopping the hate, protecting the Jews, 
and extending equal rights to all people. The literature articulates a continuation of anti-
Semitism, which is a precursor to greater atrocities against minorities. Ethnic backgrounds 
were not supposed to play a role in the Western democratic value system, yet this study 
will identify many cases where the system is not upholding its own proscription for a better 
world of equality and freedom for all mankind and protection of their human rights. 
1. On Ethnic Identity in the Context of Anti-Semitism 
Ethnic identity beliefs are not developed in a vacuum but influenced according to 
different ethnicities’ economic status’, social environments, wars or other significant 
events, persecutions or extreme difficulties which push them to extreme circumstances.21 
Racial and ethnic borders are social constructions that fluctuate continually, are described 
as a separation between an Other by all groups toward other groups, and are continually 
evolving and they have real consequences on the underlying construction of social 
hierarchies.22 Although anti-Semitism is not the only factor in why these groups make their 
decisions or establish policy, the role it plays is significant.  
The archetypal notion of Jews as folk devils, nefarious feeders of children’s blood 
and perpetrators of violent global conspiracies, draws on old rhetoric that persists in the 
anti-Semitic attitudes in modern Europe.23  Bonacich describes the Jews as a “middleman 
 
21 Claire Rosenson, “Jewish Identity Construction in Contemporary Poland: Dialogue between 
Generations,” http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1080/13501679608577831 (Taylor & Francis Group, 
June 19, 2008), 67–78, world, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501679608577831. 
22 Aziza Khazzoom, “The Great Chain of Orientalism: Jewish Identity, Stigma Management, and 
Ethnic Exclusion in Israel,” American Sociological Review 68, no. 4 (2003): 481, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1519736. 
23 Pnina Werbner, “Folk Devils and Racist Imaginaries in a Global Prism: Islamophobia and Anti-
Semitism in the Twenty-First Century,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 3 (March 1, 2013): 450–67, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2013.734384. 
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minority group.”24 Middleman minorities are economically successful, highly assimilated, 
cultured, wealthy and successful, and as Werbner explains, are subject to another 
archetypal folk devil called the witch.25   
2. On Nationalism and its Connection with Anti-Semitism 
Nationalism, according to Robert Gildea, is defined as “the feeling that belonging 
to a nation is more important than belonging to a town, province, class, social order, or 
religious group, and the struggle for a state to defend the interests and identity of that 
nation.”26 Nationalism must be analyzed in its two opposed visions, civic and ethnic.27 
Civic nationalism is associated with the West and is generally seen as being more liberal 
and positive, while ethnic nationalism is associated with the East and is generally seen as 
racial and populist. Ethnic nationalism is more exclusive and organic in nature; civic 
nationalism is more inclusive and emphasizes the legal, political, and ideological 
requirements of belonging to their nation.28 However, these distinctions can lead to 
misconceptions of the two forms of nationalism, as some see them as opposed to each other 
or mutually exclusive in principle but not in practice causing confusion.29 Zubrzycki 
suggests that the two terms, civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism, be used as ideal 
types, following the Weberian model to ease this confusion.30 
 
24 Edna Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman Minorities,” American Sociological Review 38, no. 5 
(October 1973): 583–594, https://doi.org/10.2307/2094409. 
25 Werbner, “Folk Devils and Racist Imaginaries in a Global Prism.” 
26 Robert Gildea, Barricades and Borders: Europe, 1800–1914, 3rd ed (Oxford ; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 52. 
27 Genevieve Zubrzycki, “‘We, the Polish Nation’: Ethnic and Civic Visions of Nationhood in Post-
Communist Constitutional Debates,” Springer 30, no. 5 (2020): 654. 
28 Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas, “What Is New and What Is Nationalist about Europe’s 
New Nationalism? Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Europe,” Nations and Nationalism 25, no. 2 
(April 2019): 409–34, https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12515. 
29 Zubrzycki, “‘We, the Polish Nation’: Ethnic and Civic Visions of Nationhood in Post-Communist 
Constitutional Debates,” 629. 
30 Zubrzycki, 629–30. 
8 
a. Categories of Nationalism 
Zubrzycki offers that nationalism should be observed in four categories.31 First, the 
methodological guide for how civic and ethnic ideal types can be used in the cultural 
construction of a nation.32 Second, relative successes of the model in historical and specific 
narratives or events which frame a nation.33 Third, nationalist sentiments and how 
powerful they are for a nation and affixed symbolic texts, memorial locations, among other 
sites for a nation.34 Finally, that nations are not fixed but free-floating in their idea of 
nationalism.35 Using these categories when judging European state nationalism as a 
concern and linking a state’s nationalistic mindset with ethnic, specifically anti-Semitic, 
discourse will allow an outside observer to better understand why nationalism is a stress 
on democratic values.  
When contemporary social scientists write about nationalism, they tend to stress 
the dependent aspects of group identity, which draws on cultural and political 
manufacturing by politicians and ideologists.36 Benedict Anderson explained that the 
concept of imagined communities is constructed, not natural.37 The ethnonational identity 
is not innate or inevitable as many nationalists would argue, as the identity is partly 
constructed making it fragile and easily manipulated.38 Modern state creation has 
highlighted enduring propensities of the human spirit sourced in solidarity and enmity, 
through ethnonationalism, which will remain for generations to come.39 
 
31 Zubrzycki, 630. 
32 Zubrzycki, 630. 
33 Zubrzycki, 630. 
34 Zubrzycki, 630. 
35 Zubrzycki, 631. 
36 Jerry Z. Muller, “Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs 87, 
no. 2 (2008): 35. 
37 Muller, 35. 
38 Muller, 35. 
39 Muller, 35. 
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b. New Nationalism 
“New nationalism” combines populism, the commonly understood concept of 
nationalism already discussed, and the far-right elements commonly associated with 
populism. Populism and nationalism are two different concepts. Populism pulls from the 
hostile relationships between the “real people” of a country and the corrupt elites—the “us 
versus them” concept.40 Populism is associated with the far right and draws on the idea of 
the pure people, where the popular will for the democratic portion of the people and liberal 
in its critiques of intermediary democratic institutions, empower the populists to seek to 
bypass the checks and balances of institutions, to include the rule of law and scrutiny from 
parliaments.41 Under this definition, populism is described often as a type of democratic 
illiberalism.42  
Nationalism is an antagonistic relationship amid an in group and an out group and 
is described by Freeden as a “thin ideology.”43 He explains that a thin ideology “is one 
that, like mainstream ideologies, has an identifiable morphology but, unlike mainstream 
ideologies, a restricted one” and it serves itself from wider contexts.44 The goal of 
nationalistic groups is to attain and preserve unity, identity, and autonomy of their nation.45 
National homogeneity and sovereignty are key concepts wherein exclusion is an inherent 
byproduct.46  
 
40 Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 1–
123; Daphne Halikiopoulou and Tim Vlandas, “What Is New and What Is Nationalist about Europe’s New 
Nationalism? Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Europe,” Nations and Nationalism 25, no. 2 (April 
2019): 409–34, https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12515. 
41 Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, “What Is New and What Is Nationalist about Europe’s New 
Nationalism?,” April 2019, 409–34. 
42 Takis S. Pappas, Populism and Liberal Democracy: A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis, 1st 
ed. (Oxford University Press, 2019), 52, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198837886.001.0001. 
43 Michael Freeden, Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), 98. 
44 Freeden, 98. 
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New nationalism is a common rise of parties with a shared emphasis on their 
national sovereignty, positions on immigration, and national preferences, who are skeptical 
of supranational institutions such as the EU and are supporters of anti-elitism.47 The new 
nationalism is a mostly uniform phenomenon across Europe where parties emphasize their 
similarities.48 The key difference between new and old nationalism is that new nationalism 
merges populism with nationalism drawing on social antagonistic relationships.49 The new 
nationalism combines the will of the people, identifying the people as “the pure people,” 
according to Halikiopoulou and Vlandas drawing from the Economist 2016, and thus 
narrowing the ethnic understanding of a nation and portraying the pure people as struggling 
against the corrupt elites from both the domestic and international levels.50 In this thesis, 
the word nationalism will henceforth be used to describe this new nationalism.51  
Nationalism complicates the distinction between Jews and true citizens of a nation, 
where definitions of who is Jewish and who is a true or real national citizen are questions 
among the people of the state searching for their identity.52 If identity is based not only on 
the presumptions of blood “purity,” but on the civic allegiance one has, precise definitions 
of who citizens truly are becomes much more difficult.53 Nationalism provides a base for 
exclusion in a state and in turn promotes anti-Semitism, as Jews continue to be perceived 
as foreigners or aliens within European nations. 
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3. Anti-Semitism  
This “alien” aspect owes something to the fact that, throughout history, the Jews 
were in seemingly continual exile.54 Jews under the Soviet era, for example, were not 
considered to be members of their states; Jews were decisively separate and one recount of 
this was explained that anti-Semitism is not seen in terms of Christians and Jews, but of 
nationality and Jew.55 The alien is seen as the source of all the misfortunes among the 
people and as such, the alien becomes the scapegoat for those misfortunes.56  
a. On the Levels of anti-Semitism  
Anti-Semitism may be thought of in terms of “weak” and “strong.” Some groups, 
organizations, or individuals are strongly anti-Semitic while others may only hold certain 
anti-Semitic attitudes that are small in number or weak in intensity.57 Weak anti-Semites 
use what are called dog whistles to project their messaging. A dog whistle is a sort of coded 
message passed between groups of a similar racial or political outlook that contains 
undertones that unsuspecting listeners or viewers will not grasp.58 Mark Liberman’s 
explains: “While many people might hear ‘international banks’ quite literally…anti-
Semites hear something very different. After all, the supposed existence of a cabal of 
international Jewish bankers working to undermine U.S. democracy is a recurring 
theme.”59 He adds an example: “Take the use of the word “coincidence” as a dog whistle. 
In the recent kerfuffle over the “Coincidence Detector” app, many news readers learned 
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that internet anti-Semites use “coincidence” to mean, roughly, a Jewish conspiracy.”60 Dog 
whistles only work if no one outside the intended audience identifies them as anti-Semitic, 
but once visible, many are clearly identified as anti-Semitic.61 There can be arguments to 
the use of coded dog whistles as conspiracies, as some use terms without any meaning 
behind them and readers or listeners take offense quite easily.62 For example, after World 
War II, as described by Phyllis Goldstein, “the slightest remark or any official measure, be 
it one not even intended to apply to [Jewish DPs], [(deported Persons)], would be discussed 
on a single criterion: ‘Is it or is it not antisemitic?’”63 But the Jews had good reason to be 
suspicious of anyone after the horrors of the concentration camps and as Goldstein writes, 
“anti-Semitism remained a force in the world” despite the Holocaust and the efforts to bring 
the responsible murderers to justice.64  
Strong anti-Semites are open with their anti-Semitism, and care less to disclose 
their messages in code. These anti-Semites are seen today in Neo-Nazi groups and far right 
parties across Europe.65 Many governments have expressed openly their anti-Semitic 
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b. New Anti-Semitism 
Like nationalism, anti-Semitism has evolved in its meaning and expression, 
emerging as a new phenomenon in recent years. Ron Rosenbaum, in his book Those Who 
Forget the Past: The Question of Anti-Semitism, expresses his views on new anti-Semitism 
as having not just one definition in the post-Holocaust period. He identifies two waves of 
new-antisemitism and further explains that another scholar, Yehuda Bauer, believes there 
have been four post-war waves, although we will only focus on two here.67  
In the first post war wave, Rosenbaum suggests that anti-Semitism was not exactly 
new and it was the scale of the evils of the Holocaust that was the new addition.68 
Holocaust anti-Semitism differs from pre-1939 anti-Semitism by way of the Holocaust 
shadowing and staining what might have been if the Jews were not brutally murdered in 
WWII.69 The Holocaust has become the standard by which extreme evil is now 
measured.70 Rosembaum explains that “casual” anti-Semitism is identified by anti-Semitic 
remarks, slurs or jokes.71 After the war, these previously permitted prejudices and 
persecutions in culture became seen as unacceptable.72  
The second wave, after 9/11, which took the form of a conspiracy that the Jews 
were behind the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, was a way of explaining the 
attacks that were blamed, unjustly, on “innocent Islamic terrorists” as Rosenbaum 
describes the anti-Semitic way of thinking.73 One such conspiracy was that Ariel Sharon 
worked with the Mossad and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to carry out the attacks, 
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blamed them on the Taliban, and took over the opium trade in Afghanistan after the U.S. 
invaded in retaliation.74  
Ehud Rosen explains that there is a campaign to arrest senior Israeli leaders on war 
crime charges as they visit European countries.75 These campaigns and attitudes, casting 
the Israelis as war criminals and the aggressors, are in conjunction with left-wing groups 
who campaign for supporting the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, 
that accuses the state of Israel of being an “apartheid” state.76 Diasporic Liberal-left Jews 
are seeking ways to counter the new anti-Semitic rhetoric portrayed by Islamic 
organizations, which call Israel a Nazi state.77 
New anti-Semitism is described as an updated version of historical anti-Semitism. 
Arguments about when old anti-Semitism became new anti-Semitism vary across the 
literature, with no consensus.78 The non-consensus makes pinning down a definition 
difficult. Is the anti-Semitism seen today a manifestation of the old or is it something 
completely different?  
New anti-Semitism was distinguished from the old upon the Haskalah, also known 
as the Jewish Enlightenment, and assimilated and integrated the Jewish people, to an 
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extent, into the Christian dominated European nations.79 During the Haskalah, Jewish 
people would refrain from wearing their traditional dress, start speaking the local 
languages, adopt local grooming standards, and essentially adapt to the local way of life, 
treating their Jewish traditions as more private and personal.80 Yet these gestures led to 
further anti-Semitic rhetoric, as now Jews were seen as indistinguishable from the local 
populace.81 Conspiracy theories took hold and pushed anti-Jewish rhetoric to new 
heights.82 As Gilman writes, “now that they didn’t wear their traditional clothing now 
where are the Jews?”83 This question of not being able to identify the Jews among the 
population struck fear in the minds of the non-Jewish citizens, as they saw the Jews as a 
hidden and lurking threat. 
Turda and Weindling argue that new anti-Semitism began in the early twentieth 
century alongside the new nationalism, creating a political sphere with racial 
characteristics.84 The new anti-Semitism used a new form of propaganda, revealing anti-
Semitism as a political current, independent from other parties and factions.85 Zuckerman 
explained that the new anti-Semitism has transcended boundaries, nationalities, social 
systems and politics, re-emerging as anti-Zionism in Europe.86  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses two case studies—Poland and Germany—chosen for both their 
membership in the supranational organizations and by their distinct pasts surrounding anti-
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Semitism. Both countries’ entrance into NATO and the EU are also reason for their case 
study selection to investigate the research question. The focus is on Poland and Germany 
but can be applied to many other European nations and to an extent, even those outside the 
supranational organizations identified here. The Polish-German relationship, as identified 
by Piotr Buras and Josef Janning, “forms the principal bridge between east and west, 
connecting two still rather different parts of the EU.”87 Poland is a notable case study 
because of its unique domestic makeup of its homogeneous society on both ethnic and 
religious fronts, coupled with its accession to NATO and the EU from the former Soviet 
Bloc. Germany is also significant as a case study because of its anti-Semitic past and its 
status as an early member of both NATO and the EU. Their relationship, therefore, is key 
in any future European project and issues within either country is a problem for the entire 
bloc.88  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter I provides a historical background of 
anti-Semitism in Europe, establishing the reason for asking the research question on how 
anti-Semitism ramifies in European government and society and how it impacts the grater 
supranational organizations. The assumption in this study of the hatred of Jews in Poland 
and Germany proceeds from many similarities but also by differences, essentially 
comparing and contrasting the two countries. The polish case in Chapter III reviews anti-
Semitism from the interwar period 1919 to the present. Moreover, the chapter examines 
the role of contemporary anti-Semitism in Poland, and how it relates to NATO and the EU, 
as well as bilateral relations with Germany. Finally, the Polish case since 2015, when the 
PiS right wing party took over, reveals a disturbing increase in anti-Semitic manifestations 
in government and society, supported by both the church and right-wing politicians. 
Chapter IV examines Germany in the past and present. In addition to the unfortunate record 
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of the past, the chapter scrutinizes contemporary questions of the German anti-Semitism 
and NATO and the EU. The German case expresses the distance for anti-Semitic attitudes 
by the government and the older German generations clashing with the new generations 
whose ideas of German nationalism bring about anti-Semitic acceptance in the society at 
large. Finally, Chapter V analyses the observed evidence of the challenges NATO and the 
EU face when dealing with the issue of anti-Semitism and what both case studies bring to 
the larger picture of European stability and security under the anti-Semitism resurgence, 
raising questions of human rights violations and the dissolving shared values among 
member states.  
  
18 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
19 
II. A HISTORY OF ANTI-SEMITISM  
During the time of Roman reign (around the first century BCE), Jewish leadership 
in Palestine, along with the Diaspora, cooperated and pressed for coexistence amongst 
Rome and the Jews, and a privileged status was established for the Jews in Roman 
society.89 The elevated status started to deteriorate upon Christianity’s founding as the 
official religion of the Roman Empire (380CE), which created anti-Semitic legislation 
under what is known as Christian anti-Semitism.90 Roman laws were created to protect the 
Roman dominance from anything that could jeopardize their rule.91 Christian anti-
Semitism must be recognized as a unique and new factor of antique anti-Semitism, which 
predated Christianity.92 The unique hatred for Jews by Christians comes from their dispute 
over Christ as the true Messiah, which is at the heart of Christian faith.93  
A. GEOGRAPHY 
Geography has had a large influence on anti-Semitism seen across Central Europe. 
There are significant differences between the Eastern and Western Jews, but boundaries 
are not clearly defined in much of the literature. The Polish and German Jews of medieval 
times noticeably varied naturally from one another, as German Jews were more prosperous 
and assimilated far more than Polish Jews, for example.94 Medieval anti-Semitism called 
for the “lying Jews” to be expelled from the West, notably Germany, sending Jews fleeing 
eastward toward the border of Poland that abutted Russia.95 The eastward migration 
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resulted in major Western areas having few to no professing Jews and those who remained 
were economically broken, socially degraded, and seen as the dregs of society, effectively 
ruining Western Jewry.96  
B. RULING OVER THE JEWS 
At its start, anti-Semitism was used to legitimize the rule of those in power 
beginning with the Christians, moving into the realm of other nations as they adopted 
Christianity as the dominant state religion, and politically for those leaders within the 
nations to retain their power based on both the support of the church and the majority of 
the population’s religious beliefs.97 Lindemann explains that, during the times of the 
Jewish enlightenment (from the late 1700s through the late 1800s), Jewish immigrants were 
less of a concern in western Europe than they were in Russia.98 The Western Jewry was 
less of a concern due to the blending of Jewish and non-Jewish values and cultures, as Jews 
were becoming “perfect citizens” in the west in the early nineteenth century.99 In the words 
of Moses Mendelssohn, “Be a Jew in your home and a man outside it.”100 The idea was 
that the only way a Jew could be a man in society was by concealing his Jewish identity.101  
The Jews of the early 20th century transformed themselves to look with equanimity 
towards those who did not adhere to the sacred Jewish religious traditions and laws.102 
Yiddish and Spagnuoli were not spoken as much and vernacular was employed by their 
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non-Jewish neighbors, which integrated them into the western countries.103 The 
integration included changing their names, appearance, and general attempts to gain 
commonalities among their fellow (Christian) citizens.104  
Many English literature investigations previous to 1911, according to Fishberg, 
showed that the scholar’s opinions of that era were that Jews allegedly maintained an 
absolute racial purity for several thousands of years and would prove hard to assimilate 
into societies.105 Indeed, many European Jews were proud of their established blood-lines 
while other Jews felt a state harboring an alien race indefinitely was likely to allow for 
mixture within the general population and would be to their peril.106 
C. CONCLUSION 
From the mid-19th century Anti-Semitism became nationalistic and racial rather 
than Christian, as anti-Judaism beginning especially in a period from the late 1850s until 
the years prior to 1914, took hold.107 Anti-Semitism was the tool for non-Jews to 
disenfranchise and destroy Jews as they were seen as a separate alien race.108 The position 
would be used to justify massacres, racial anti-Semitism, violence, and pogroms against 
Jews who could no longer seek protection from the state.109 
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III. POLAND: NATIONALISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM  
Anti-Semitism is typically associated with extreme right-wing ideology; however, 
in the case of Poland, it has become infused with mainstream government and Polish 
society through the country’s trend toward nationalism. Poland is a country whose 
government and society center to a great extent on religious beliefs and nationally shared 
ideal values. It is arguably one of the least diverse countries in the world, and, due in part 
to the country’s overwhelming ethnic and religious homogeneity, anti-Semitism is 
increasingly becoming accepted in its society.110 Poland is not unique among European 
nations in its anti-Semitic rhetoric, which is increasing especially within Catholic circles; 
however, the Polish people reject attempts to identify anti-Semitism in their country as 
anything other than an imagined East European backwardness, believing Poland to be 
untainted by such ideological blight.111  
The homogeneity of the current Polish ethnic and religious structure is a byproduct 
of recent, violent, historical, and political processes.112 Following World War II, most of 
Europe vowed to never again engage in human rights violations and ethnic violence, and 
created organizations that promoted racial respect and diversity.113 Polish Jews tend to 
view Polish history as a perpetual process of increasing anti-Semitism, however, that 
process has infused modern nationalism to become the new anti-Semitism.114 While Polish 
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Jews, in general, do not feel physically threatened in today’s Poland, they do feel angry 
about the government’s apparent reluctance to condemn racial and other biases.115  
Democracy within Poland, increasingly influenced by national anti-Semitism as 
seen in the Polish government and society, is in jeopardy. The influence also threatens the 
democratic goal of democratization in the region. Poland, since its admittance as a member 
of NATO and the EU, has reversed its aspirations to maintain the shared values of both 
organizations, a post-national Europe with a focus on equality while preserving 
sovereignty. Poland’s populist and ethno-nationalist frameworks strain the shared goals 
through increasing anti-Semitism, among other issues, significantly impeding combined 
efforts on foreign policy.116  
Historically, anti-Semitism has been so tied to Polish nationalism, which casts the 
Jews as the anti-Poles, that it persisted even when the Polish state disappeared during 
WWII. It has survived various, and variously illiberal, preconceptions of the nation 
throughout the 20th century to the present day. The assessment is not to say that all Poles 
are anti-Semitic and that the entire country is part of the far right; rather, it expresses the 
concern that government and church pressures on the public, using Polish nationalism as a 
convenient tool, is significantly normalizing anti-Semitism in the country and, in turn, 
threatens the values the democratic nation ought to protect. It is not the rise of anti-
Semitism, but the rise in political power of anti-Semites, that threatens present-day Poland. 
This chapter will review the history of Polish anti-Semitism, examine how anti-
Semitism is used in Polish government and society, observe the relationship between Polish 
nationalism and anti-Semitism, identify manifestations stemming from anti-Semitism in 
the country, and finally, examine the ramifications of Polish anti-Semitism on such 
supranational organizations as NATO and the EU. 
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A. RELATIONSHIPS: POLAND, NATO, AND THE EU 
The Polish government fought vigorously for Poland’s accession to NATO and the 
EU. NATO and the EU were established organizations, with NATO even called the 
European fraternity, and Poland wanted to become a member as quickly as possible prior 
to further conflicts between the East and West and the need to protect themselves from the 
new Russian Federation.117  
At the time of Poland’s pending NATO membership between 1993 and 1995, 
observers considered Poland, Hungry, the Check Republic and Slovakia as front runners 
for gaining membership.118 Multiculturalism and diversity within the established 
democratic value system were among the ideals of the two supranational organizations and 
the highest hurdles for aspiring members to clear. However, the Polish government worked 
tremendously hard to prove itself a reliable democracy capable of collaboration within the 
alliance, and finally achieved membership in March of 1999.119 As Alexandra Gheciu 
explains, Poland—along with Hungry and the Czech Republic—were all admitted to 
NATO in the first round of post-Cold War enlargement, but Slovakia was denied, due to 
its anti-democratic parties and a deficiency of regard for human rights.120 In other words, 
NATO enlargement into formerly communist east-central Europe presumed or at least 
required a certain basic affirmation of human rights, civil liberties, and democracy—
presumably to include a rejection of anti-Semitism, as well. 
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Poland has been part of the EU for more than 16 years. It has been hailed as an 
exemplary example for other aspiring post-war democracies to follow.121 Yet the promises 
Poland made as part of its membership are being undermined by the country’s re-emergent 
and very open anti-Semitism, made acceptable by a now mainstream nationalistic idea of 
the Polish identity. Because of the authoritarian changes its government made to the Act 
on the Constitutional Tribunal, Poland is now the object of looming sanctions.122 The 
transition suggests the beginning of the end of the promise to NATO and the EU, through 
the silent majority following the few in power who continue to allow such divergence in 
values. Like Slovakia years before, Poland now seems to lack both democratic values and 
a concern for human rights. Unlike Slovakia, Poland does not seem especially keen to right 
its course toward these vaunted Western values. 
Polish nationalism is to some extent inherently anti-Semitic in that the country has 
historically used anti-Semitism as a tool to maintain political regimes and enable the 
Catholic church to maintain legitimacy. The civic and ethnic ideal type of society for Poles 
has been significantly impacted by the ethnic and religious homogeneity that formed up 
after WWII. Polish nationalism is strongly ethnic in nature, and Poles continue to seek 
clarity on the cultural construction of their nation. As Poland has fought throughout its 
history for independence and sovereignty and has pushed back oppressing regimes from 
both the West and the East, its patriotism and sense of pride has developed largely in terms 
of threats from “Others,” which is key to identifying how anti-Semitism falls in line with 
Polish nationalism. The Jews, outside of ethnic Poles and Catholic Poles, have essentially 
been branded as Other, meaning they are excluded from all that is Polish. The separation 
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equates to a threat to the Polish nation’s continued existence as a democracy, and its civic 
nationalism functions as a facade to bolster outside views of the country as a democratic 
and multicultural state. 
B. ANTI-SEMITIC HISTORY IN POLAND (1800-1989) 
 Poland was significantly diverse for most of its pre-WWII history, 
populated by different ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups.123 It was a multi-religious 
state with Protestant, Uniate Catholic, Roman catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Muslim, and 
Jewish citizens, with three-quarters of the world’s Jewish population living in Poland prior 
to WWII.124 The diversity that was so prominent prior to the war was dramatically changed 
after the war and in post-war border shifts, state-sponsored ethnic cleansing, pogroms, and 
anti-Semitic purges.125 
The main nationalist party in the late 19th century and early 20th century, the 
National Democrats, led by Roman Dmowski, saw Jews as a security threat to the nation 
and they became known as a fifth column, alleged to have engaged in many conspiracies 
threatening the survival of Poland as a nation.126 (Naturally, the more extremist parties, 
including those that emerged as or became fascist between the world wars, embraced 
various degrees of anti-Semitism, as well.127 The alarming point about the National 
Democrats is that this nationalist party was so openly and thoroughly anti-Semitic.) 
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Dmowski’s ideas led to comparisons of the Jews to disease and parasites, another supposed 
threat to the Polish people.128 Dmowski also argued that Jews undermined morality 
through sexual perversion.129 In consequence, all attempts to integrate or assimilate Jews, 
according to Dmowski, were doomed to fail.130  
After the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1919–1921, an agnostic anti-Russian ex-
revolutionary named Marshal Jozef Piłsudski sought to establish a multicultural, multi-
confessional Poland, where like-minded counterparts of Catholic Poles—ethnic Jews, 
Germans, and Ukrainians—would share civic life.131 Domowski took dominance over the 
public in voting approval but in 1926, Piłsudski took over in a coup, lasting as the effective 
ruler of Poland until 1935; but did not see his vision accomplished prior to his death and 
the outbreak of WWII.132 
With the German assault on Poland in 1939, a horrible new chapter of Jewish 
existence in Poland dawned in the face of Nazi aggression.133  German policy immediately 
made the Jews of Poland into a target within the campaign of national dismemberment. 
Polish Jews were singled out by Schutzstaffel (SS) killing squads in the first days of the 
Polish campaign.134 Once the Nazi division of Poland took hold by 1940, the creation of 
a ghetto structure especially in the so called General Government represented an escalation 
of this misery which then took on a new stage of horror with the campaign in the USSR.135 
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The final most awful events in 1941–1942 concerned the decision to embark on 
industrialized mass murder with the extermination camp at Birkenau and the Operation 
Reinhard camps in the East of Poland.136   
Poles would later participate in pogroms, killing Jews on their own, taking 
advantage of the Nazis’ mutual hatred for the Jews during the occupation.137 The Nazis 
helped to normalize and promote anti-Semitism during the war, allowing it to emerge 
strengthened and more outwardly violent just after war’s end.  
1. Post-War Impacts on Poland
Following WWII, the desire of the Poles for a homogeneous nation in whichever 
borders were left to them excluded all who were not ethnically Polish, and as Jews were 
not considered to be Polish, but Jewish by ethnicity, they were not part of this aspiration 
for the new Poland.138  
The Central Committee for Jews in Poland estimated that out of 3,000,000 Jews 
who resided in pre-war Poland, just 50,000 were left after the cessation of hostilities.139 
Approximately 90 percent of the Jewish population in pre-war Poland had been killed 
during the war—mostly in the Nazi death camps or in the ghettos that fed them.140 The 
Jews returning trying to resettle their old residences, and seeing further violence toward 
the returning Jewish communities, appealed to the Catholic church for assistance and 
protection.141 They were told that as Jews, and part of the communist party, they did not 
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warrant protection by the church and were turned away.142 The refusal of the Church to 
provide any assistance to the Jews, inciting acts such as the Kielce pogrom, and retaining 
a negative view of Jews, allowed the continuance of anti-Semitism seen in much of the 
religious interactions within Poland today.  
2. Soviet Occupation
In the post-war period, when the logic of socialism was meant, in part, to replace 
the fondest notions of nationalism with the communist collective utopia, Poles still engaged 
in anti-Semitism that ranged from the bureaucratic and conversational to the murderous. 
The state advocated Polish homogeneity during the post war period.143 State institutions 
built and bolstered their own legitimacy by putting emphasis on the new ethnonational and 
denominational homogeneity and by suppressing the historical memory of Polish diversity 
to gain and maintain power.144  
For example, the population of Jewish residents in Kielce grew from 212 in 1945 
to 304 in 1946.145 However, Kielce proved far from a haven. In Kielce, as in many other 
parts of Poland, communists were equated with being ruled by the Jews and under Stalin’s 
direct control.146147 In July of 1946, Soviet authorities and Polish secret police conducted 
a massive pogrom, resulting in the deaths of 42 Jews.148 The attacks were prolonged and 
sustained by the town community against a Jewish center, where both the police and 
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security services took no actions to stop the massacres.149 The act was not a random 
outburst of rage against a group of Jews; it was a telling sign that both Poles and communist 
authorities were complicit in the continued hatred for Jews after the war’s end.150  
In the late 1950s and 1960s, anti-Semitism was quiescent at surface level, but at the 
political core it was a factor of factional struggles within the internal Communist party.151 
After Nikita Khrushchev gave his unprecedented speech to the Soviet Communist party 
denouncing the horrible abuses of Stalinism, Poland felt the effects of the speech right 
away.152 Hardline policies were eased, which made it easier for Jews to obtain exit visas 
but also allowed political freedoms to all which gave voice to the old anti-Semitism.153 
In March of 1968, the Communist secret police instigated an anti-Semitic purge.154 
The socialist government pushed an anti-Zionist media campaign in conjunction with the 
massive purge of Jewish employees from government institutions and the party organs 
within the country.155 The purge of personnel continued into the latter part of summer, 
1968.156 Months of anti-Semitic responses across Poland followed and many Jewish Poles 
fled the country as a result.157 This crushing government purge of Polish Jews resulted in 
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the complete suppression of a student led reform movement and within a year, drove fifteen 
thousand Jews out of Poland.158 Polish leader Edward Gierek participated in the 1968 anti-
Jewish campaign and did not dissociate himself or his government from the event, with no 
condemnation for the government’s anti-Jewish aspect.159 Anti-Zionist literature and 
Judeophobic works were created in a vast industry of books that the Communist party fully 
sponsored from the 1960s through the 1970s.160 An example of such literature can be seen 
in Figure 1, as one such publication depicts Jews using their tentacles to reach all across 
the globe. A total of 112 books of this type were created during this timeframe.161  
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Anti-Zionist caricature displayed in 
the Soviet magazine, Krokodil, 1972. 
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In the beginning of the1970s, several Soviet propagandists, such as Yuri Ivanov 
and Vladimir Bolshakov, pushed anti-Semitism through the theory of Zionism as the prime 
enemy of the Soviet people.163 In 1974, Valery Emelyanov developed an especially toxic 
form of anti-Zionism in the communist party, telling audiences in Moscow that Zionism 
was aimed at mastering the world and would rise to completion in the year 2000.164 The 
campaigns against the Jews in Moscow caused fears to rise about Jews across the Soviet 
Union, to include Poland, resulting in additional rhetoric and propaganda within Poland as 
well. Gierek’s regime employed anti-Jewish themes in his official propaganda during 
events between 1975 and 1976 as new Polish constitution debates were in full swing.165 
Emelyanov published his work, De-Zionistation, in 1980, which used the classic Russian 
Protocols fashion back to King Solomon from 3,000 years ago to further anti-Semitic 
feeling among Poles.166 He equated the Jews of Israel legitimizing themselves as a chosen 
people to an ideology of racial superiority as key evidence for his discrimination against 
the Jews.167 De-Zionistation and other works were mushrooming across the Soviet Union 
pushing anti-Zionistic rhetoric and discrimination against the Jews in higher education as 
well as exclusion from military, political and diplomatic careers.168  
 3. Anti-Semitism in Democratic Poland (1989–2015)
The 1990 Polish elections were filled with anti-Semitic sentiments that took a new 
turn as Lech Walesa began a smear campaign against his opponent, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 
the liberal Catholic prime minister.169 Walesa called Mazowiecki a crypto-Jew and soft on 
Communism, playing on a theme that Mazowiecki was controlled by the Jews so that “Real 
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Poles” must take control and govern the Polish state.170 As Walesa’s campaigns were 
successful, the use of anti-Jewish sentiments demonstrates quite clearly that anti-Semitism 
in Poland remained alive and well during this time.171  
Poles were reacquainted with the notion that they had a role in the Holocaust, as 
expressed in Jan Gross’ book Neighbors, which recounted ethnic Poles murdering Jewish 
neighbors in July of 1941.172 The realization that they were not just victims but had 
historical ties to the plight of the Jews has led to a process of Polish national demystification 
which continues today.173  
Poland saw a dramatic increase in the size and popularity of many Jewish cultural 
festivals in the 1990s and 2000s.174 As of 2013, there were nearly forty festivals dedicated 
to the Jewish culture held in many cities across the nation.175  
The post-Soviet and post-EU Poland saw a vigorous political battle over 
pluralism.176 Intellectuals, the Catholic church, and politicians alike, from the left and 
center, stressed Polish ideological heterogeneity, arguing that a plural society, religion, and 
particularly for Poland, Catholicism, was competing among many overlapping value 
systems.177 The notion led to a demand among these groups to defend a confessional 
neutrality of the nation to protect the rights of the minorities.178 Bringing together the 
majority, under the religious, national, and cultural umbrellas, makes gaining votes easier 
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and empowers those who wish to exclude the others from Poland.179 Jews were left as the 
outsiders in this outbursts of nationalism by the Polish majority, which has sown continued 
hate and discontent toward Poland’s few remaining Jews.  
C. ANTI-SEMITISM IN POLAND TODAY
Poland holds elections every five years, and the citizens vote for political candidates
through direct elections, from a multi-party-political system.180 In Polish democratic 
elections, candidates rely heavily on the Church and on support by their society to keep 
office.181 The political parties push the values which they feel will keep them in power 
and are most popular with the public.  
The effort of social activists, ordinary citizens, state agencies, and Jewish and non-
Jewish elites to combat extreme (or even extremist) nationalism within Poland using the 
country’s historical diversity is the hope to build a more open society and renew the lost 
polity to meet standards within the international normalcy model of nationhood.182 These 
international democratic values, which encourage pluralism and multiculturalism, are 
important for Poland to remain in good standing with the other democracies around the 
world and security institutions within Central Europe.183  
Media platforms contribute to the Polish society’s anti-Semitism. Zubrzycki 
explained that “ethno-religious nationalists contend that ‘Jews’ are contaminating the 
[Polish] nation with their civic ideals, building a pernicious post-national, cosmopolitan 
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world, and must therefore be politically marginalized.”184 Newspapers such as Nasz 
Dziennik, Gazeta Polska, or the Catholic weekly Niedziela all regularly display anti-
Semitism.185 The anti-Semitism seen in these media platforms are typically based on two 
main themes.186 One is that of the Jew as an alien and discrediting opponents by accusing 
them of having Jewish origins and in turn accusing them of mysterious alien control or 
loyal to other countries or organizations.187 These accusations without bases, such as 
calling a political opponent a Jew to discredit their campaign, can be a form of magical 
anti-Semitism. The second relates to the economy and accuses foreign Jewish capital of 
taking control of key businesses within Poland and Polish citizens’ claims on prewar 
property ownership. The Jews are blamed for exploiting or conspiring to control the 
country.188 
Radio broadcasting is an extremely influential medium among the Polish 
population, as it enables the proliferation of anti-Semitic rhetoric and agendas in Poland. 
Radio Maryja is one such radio station and is arguably one of the most influential in the 
country.189 The station has empowered the radical right and has been a leading voice in 
the Polish Catholic Church.190 Funded by groups in the United States and by a noted anti-
Semite, Jan Kobylanski, a Polish émigré millionaire, the radio station promotes narratives 
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that are based on national extremism, anti-Semitism, as well as conspiracy theories, both 
openly displayed and shrouded in code.191 Anti-Semitic content on radio Maryia has 
included ugly stereotyping, theories that claim Jews were responsible for communist-era 
repression, and accusations that Jews use the Holocaust to leverage compensation 
payments from the Polish government.192 The radio station is used as a political platform 
and helps push clearly xenophobic and anti-Semitic agendas.193   
Poland’s current government is the Law and Justice party (PiS) as of 2015, which 
identifies Poland as a monolithic state where ethnicity, not civic national identity, forms its 
base.194 An example of the government’s tolerance of anti-Semitism using Polish 
nationalism occurred in November of 2018, when the Polish media reported that Tomasz 
Greniuch, a nationalist and historian, was nominated to become the leader of the Opole 
Institute of National Remembrance office.195 He had been the chief of the National Radical 
Camp (NRC) in Opole and organized a commemoration march for a historical anti-Jewish 
pogrom in 2005.196 The UN Committee for the Elimination of Radical Discrimination has 
identified the NRC as fascist and called on Poland to ban the group for promoting national 
hatred.197  
Seeing anti-Semitism as a key influencer in elections within Poland indicates the 
deep connection that anti-Semitism has on the country’s proceeded values. Nationalism is 
seen as one of the most, if not the most, important aspects of the political environment in 
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Polish political elections as campaigns in recent years are centered around nationalism.198 
As described by Pankowski and Pankowski, political commentary has focused mostly on 
the construction of a collective identity for the “real Poles.”199 
Continuing the ideals of Dmowski, this political landscape for excluding Jews is 
still ever present in today’s politics. The need to have an enemy to retain legitimacy seems 
to be the continual theme with these views. Racial and ethnic differences make it difficult 
for Poland to move away from homogeneity as well as the far-right movements that have 
pushed their way into the mainstream political arena by suppressing the historical memory 
of Polish diversity to gain and maintain power.200 The homogeneity goes hand in hand 
with nationalism, which still represents the “us versus them” mentality of today.  
D. CONCLUSION
In summary, this case study has shown that anti-Semitism is far from removed
within Polish government and society and plays a large factor in how the country manages 
its population, religion, and international affairs. Poland, as an ethnically and 
denominationally homogeneous society, pulling away from democratic values, pushing 
towards far-right authoritarian and totalitarian rule, and embracing the acceptance of anti-
Semitism among other ethnic and religious biases, will negatively affect Central European 
security institutions by degrading the overall stability and strength of the collective 
democracies, as well as decreasing the project of democratization within the region.201 
Poland as well as other countries across Europe have seen a rise in anti-Semitism in recent 
years, as seen in the case of Germany, and as the international community feeds off 
approval or condemnation for other country actions. The new hated could deterioration of 
peace, progress, and security is setting a bad example in central Europe. In the year 2021, 
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despite Poland’s near perfect assimilation into western democratic values this hatred puts 
into question the democratic system in central Europe. 
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IV. GERMANY: OLD HATREDS AND NEW THREATS 
Anti-Semitism, typically associated with the extreme right, is increasingly 
becoming more mainstream among German youth, where their enthusiasm for nationalism 
has brought out old anti-Semitic hatreds in German society. Germany is a country whose 
government and society, after WWII and upon reunification, centered to a great extent on 
rebranding their nation to bring about never again beliefs and a liberal globalization 
mindset. Germans after the war have strived to foster shared ideal values across Europe 
and rely upon unity as the pillars to German economic success, but as the youth press 
towards the nationalistic mindset, anti-Semitism and other manifestations stemming from 
the inherent need to preserve the German nation, have increased in recent years. 
A. RELATIONSHIPS: GERMANY, NATO, AND THE EU 
For the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), accession to NATO and the EU—as 
an early member of both organizations—signified the democratic intentions and context of 
the Bonn Republic, which the unified FRG continues to uphold and advance at the highest 
levels. Following the horrors of state-organized genocide in World War II, the Germans 
made promises to themselves and the world that, among other things, the Holocaust as well 
as the integral nationalism and ethnic hatred that drove it would “never again” gain any 
currency in German culture or politics. Nonetheless, anti-Semitism persists, presenting 
grave concerns about how Germany will hold together the European unity under NATO 
and the EU with a decline of democratic values persisting among member states by 
increases in human rights violations through anti-Semitism as just one example of hatreds 
undermining the fundamental values of the supranational organizations.  
Civic nationalism within Germany emerged after World War II to replace ethnic 
nationalism, but as multi-culturalism increased, fear of integration with the perceived 
“other”—including most particularly Jews—has revived ethno-nationalism and populism, 
where conflict with rival states and NATO and the EU, respectively, feed demands for 
42 
extreme right sovereigntist movements to exclude all others not ethnically German—and 
raising the acceptance of anti-Semitism.202 
This chapter first will review the FRG’s post-war policies on and about NATO and 
the EU, particularly the values that both organizations espouse and enshrine. Then it will 
explore the history of German anti-Semitism, as well as manifestations of anti-Semitism in 
the FRG today and observe the ramifications of German anti-Semitism on external entities 
such as NATO and the EU.  
B. ANTI-SEMITIC HISTORY IN GERMANY (1848-1989) 
There are deep roots of anti-Semitism in Germany, where religious anti-Semitism 
shifted to scientific anti-Semitism, as a modern hate for modern times.203 The Jewish 
enlightenment, the Haskalah in Germany, beginning in the 18th century, aspired, among 
other things, to eliminate the visible differences between Jews and their Christian neighbors 
in the name of assimilating into German society on a more equal footing. The blurring of 
differences, rather than facilitating acceptance or equality, gave rise to anti-Semitism in the 
form of conspiracy theories that claimed the Jews were hiding among the German people, 
just waiting to take advantage of unsuspecting Germans.204  
Formal emancipation of Jews in Germany came with the French Republic’s 
proclamation in June of 1798 that Jews would be afforded civic rights not based on 
religious beliefs after France took over German lands and imposed their liberal ideals.205 
In 1848, Jews achieved the right to vote and hold political office in places such as the 
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Frankfurt National Assembly, bolstering the Jewish idea of becoming truly German.206 
Thus, on the one hand, formal assimilation—and equality—for Germany’s Jews was 
widespread by the middle of the 19th century. 
On the other hand, anti-Semitism intensified rapidly following 1850 after Prussia, 
the largest German state, took back lands from the French and degraded the values 
promulgated under (more) democratic rule.207 The rampant integral nationalism that 
characterized the late 19th century and, arguably, marched into World War I on all sides, 
caught up with Germany’s Jews, not unlike the rest of Europe. The loss of World War I 
was humiliating for Germans and many Germans went looking for scapegoats to blame.208 
The resentment of Jews after the war, especially the prominence of Jews in the new civilian 
government, led to politicized and often virulent anti-Semitism alongside nationalism and 
anti-Communism.209  
To be sure, the 1920s saw a rise in the prominence of Jews in German culture, 
particularly in the new realms of popular music and film. One such successful 1920s 
composer was Kurt Weill, a son of a Jewish cantor, who fled Germany to America upon 
the Nazi takeover in 1933.210 Another was Kurt Gerron, a singer and actor in the 1920s 
who was murdered in Auschwitz during the Nazi era.211 Dora Gerson was a 1920s film 
actress and prominent singer who was also murdered along with her family in 
Auschwitz.212 Still, many assimilated German Jews retained a degree of insecurity even 
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amid the notional equality of the interwar period.213 The 1922 assassination of Walther 
Rathenau, a German Jewish liberal politician then serving as foreign minister, by right-
wing extremists, seemed symbolically to derail Germany’s first democratic experiment and 
the progress of assimilation and acceptance for Jews in the Weimar Republic.214 
Also in the 1920s, there was a drastic inflation crisis, caused by currency reform 
and German reparation demands from World War I.215 The crisis affected the German 
middle class the most and stressed the population tremendously, but Germany pushed hard 
to overcome the hardships.216 At the cusp of the German inflation crisis recovery, Germans 
faced another devastating crisis, the Great Depression in 1929.217 This time, the 
combination of both crises was too much to bear for the middle class, who comprised the 
largest percentage of the voting population.218 The middle class became socially 
radicalized, angered by the frustrations of the crises, and then politically extreme, as they 
voted the Nazis into power.219  
At the time of the Nazi takeover in 1933, an estimated 500,000 Jews resided in 
Germany, with 160,000 dwelling in Berlin.220 Of the 500,000, (about 1 percent of the 
German population), in turn, 25 percent were from elsewhere in Eastern Europe as 
refugees; foreigners.221 Another 100,000 people living in Germany were not registered but 
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identified one or both of their grandparents as Jewish.222 As the Nazis consolidated their 
power in 1933–1935, the government constructed a series of anti-Semitic policies.  
The National Socialists centered their movement and eventually their policies on 
the folkish ideal, the nation as an ethno-nationalist extreme trend of Germanness.223 The 
radical racial theory, which found its culmination in the Final Solution policy, did not 
distinguish among Jewish Nationalists, Orthodox Jews, assimilated Jews, or first- or 
second-generation converts to Christianity.224 Hitler, a vicious anti-Semite, pressed 
ideologies which established his justification and basis for war; ethnic supremacy over all 
others was central in his war efforts, which were geared towards the destruction of the 
Jews.225 The extreme nationalism in the rhetoric was celebrated by Germans who wished 
to regain their dignity after the defeat in World War I.  
In 1935, Hitler implemented the Nuremberg Laws, officially defining Judaism as a 
race, and withdrew the right for Jews to be German citizens.226 Nazis tried to reorder the 
map along ethnic lines for the continent by force.227 Hitler and his ideas of a supreme race 
gained acceptance among his followers, driving the mass genocide in stages, as he tried to 
rid Europe of its Jews.228 Propaganda promoted negative stereotypes and false narratives 
about Jews. One such example is the propaganda flyer comparing Jews to diseases in 
Germany, urging the necessity to finish off the Jews, as they were cursed.229 
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Another such cruelty toward Jews during the pre-war years was seen in 1938, the 
so-called Night of Broken Glass or Crystal Night (Kristallnacht), when Jewish businesses 
and synagogues were destroyed, and Jews were beaten and killed in riots.230 At the time, 
Kristallnacht actually presented something of an image problem for the Nazis, who worried 
that everyday Germans would find the images of racial violence revolting.231 Thereafter, 
in 1938–1939, as Nazi aggression grew, Hitler’s approach to anti-Semitic policy and 
practice became more escalatory using incremental steps.232 Still, anti-Semitism was a 
foundation of National Socialism and was considered the national socialist’s most essential 
propaganda weapon.233 While pro-Nazi Germans in 1930 or 1933 were not voting for the 
Holocaust (which did not come to the planning table until 1940), the steady stream of anti-
Jewish laws, policies, images, and rhetoric certainly helped bring about the “unthinkable,” 
particularly considering how many hands worked toward it and in it every day. 
Initially, Hitler implemented a gradual indirect extermination lasting until 1941; for 
many of the measures were legalistic or administrative, and they focused on removing Jews 
from the everyday functions of the Third Reich.234 Then, however, as the war turned out 
of Hitler’s favor, and the Nazi’s last efforts to achieve victory were failing, a Final Solution 
was conceived to murder the Jews.235 Nazi Germany used the most ruthless aggression 
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and legislation seen against European Jewry in European history in its Jewish mass 
murders.236  
Anti-Semitism was a foundation of national socialism and was considered the 
national socialist’s most essential propaganda weapon.237 When Heinrich Himmler’s plans 
to resettle Germans into the new German occupied territories were disrupted by the 
assassination of his deputy, Reinhard Heydrich, Himmler pushed Adolf Eichmann, to 
accelerate his plans for the Final Solution across Europe, employing the killing to a massive 
scale.238 Together, these men were the major organizers of the Holocaust, increasing the 
killing of Jews, rapidly trying to ethnically cleanse the continent which spiraled into the 
full-blown genocide that is today known as the Holocaust or the Shoah. 
1. West Germany
West Germany, also known as the Federal Republic of Germany or Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (BRD) joined NATO in 1955 and the EU in 1958, strengthening its desire to 
uphold democratic values of equality for all citizens.239 These democratic values included 
protection for the Jews and the eradication of anti-Semitism along with any other ethnic or 
racial biases. In the quest to do right by the Jews after their traumatic and devastating ordeal 
under the Nazis, the new German democracy also established a special relationship with 
Israel since its founding.240 Bonn, the capital of the BRD stood to lose quite a bit in terms 
of foreign policy with the Arab middle east by establishing relations with Israel, as well as 
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diminishing the West German claim as the only legitimate Germany, to which Bonn’s 
foreign policy was based in the 1960s.241 Even with this looming concern, the relationship 
was forged, and special in that, many of the communications and transactions between the 
two countries were done in secret to avoid retaliations by the Arab states.242 One example 
of secret interactions was when the West German Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss, 
agreed to expand the Israeli-West German bilateral cooperation to the security realm after 
a secret meeting held in December 1957.243  
On the other hand, during the mid-1950s, the atrocities conducted by the Third 
Reich were nearly completely excluded from the public discussion in BRD, leading to a 
loss of Holocaust awareness in the country.244 Still, after the coming of age of the BRD’s 
first fully post-war generation in the middle-1960s, the Nazi past was continually 
confronted with an ascendance of a left-of-center prevailing wisdom about the evils of the 
German past. In November of 1968, for example, a woman confronted the Chancellor of 
the Christian Democratic Union party congress in Berlin, Kurt Georg Kiesinger. She called 
him a Nazi, assaulted him with a slap, and read a statement expressing the German youth’s 
rage over the government to allow former Nazis to hold leadership roles.245 The concerns 
that the older generations of Germans, those who killed Jews in the War were holding 
government positions and allowed to continue living their lives, and not changing attitudes 
to fall in line with the youth of the time, was shocking to many in the younger 
generation.246 The youth in the 1960s-1970s wanted to know what their parent’s 
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generation did in the war and felt deceived and deprived of the knowledge that their parents 
kept from them.247 The West’s new orthodoxy, allowing for integration of those deemed 
evil into society, was also the objection pressed by the far right. 
2. East Germany
Anti-Semitism was deemed essentially abolished by the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) government after purging the remaining Nazis from its party and 
governmental ranks by the 1950s.248 The supposed history of anti-fascism, made the claim 
that the Socialist Unity Party (SED) corrected any lingering issues relating to anti-Semitism 
and crimes of the Nazis, and the Holocaust and that Eastern German party leaders did not 
need any further debate on the matter.249  
Marxist theory suggested that postwar Germany would resolve the Jewish question 
quite easily, as under communist rule and in socialist ideology, all religions were 
considered equally worthless.250 Religion, the “opium of the oppressed masses,” and anti-
Semitism, a tool of the Western capitalist ruling classes, would be removed completely in 
the new socialist freedom under the Communists.251 The simplistic view of anti-Semitism 
as a vestige of quasi-feudal religious “superstition” ignored the integral-nationalistic 
aspects of modern anti-Semitism amid a broader disregard of nationalism as a force in 
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properly communist society.252 Anti-Semitism thus was officially laid to rest, according 
to the party, and rapidly became a taboo subject to discuss in the GDR.253  
Despite improved standards of living offered to the Jewish-German residents in 
East Germany, their numbers fell significantly during the mid- to late 1980s. By 1986, 
there were just 350 Jews in East Germany, with 200 registered as living in the Berlin 
community.254 The promise of socialism allowing equality to all was not the reality for 
Jews in East Germany, and as dreams of a free and equal socialist state deteriorated, Jews 
were still persecuted through purges and anti-Semitic violence, even as the Soviet Union 
fell in 1989.  
3. The Reunification of the German Nation (1989-2000)
The unification of the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1990 was a 
momentous occasion for Germans, a triumph, it seemed, of the FRG’s western orientation 
and thereby a confirmation of the German commitment to a liberal democracy.255 The 
period was known as die Wendezeit, the time of change, and it was characterized by 
extreme flux, also for divisions and tensions regarding Jews and their identities.256 Jewish 
identity was an issue, especially for Russian Jews living in Germany after reunification and 
the Union’s fall.257 Germany established liberal immigration policies for Jews, and 
although some German officials and many Jewish functionaries were not pleased with the 
immigration reforms, prohibiting Jews who were inclined to settle in Germany was 
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unimaginable.258 The question for many outside observers, regarding Jews in Germany 
during this time, was why they should live there, in the land of their former oppressors.259 
Nonetheless, the Jewish population continued to increase.260  
C. ANTI-SEMITISM TODAY 
A resurgence of German anti-Semitism came at the turn of the century and has 
grown significantly through right-wing extremism and violence.261 Germany, like other 
EU countries, saw increases in anti-Semitism in the early 2000s, as al-Aqsa Intefada 
inspired radical Islamists to pursue actions of anti-Jewish violence, serving to enthuse anti-
Semitism from the extreme far-Right.262 The anti-Semitism is linked to the Israel-Middle 
East conflicts where criticism of Israel is, on one side, justifiable to some, and on the other 
side, is anti-Semitic.263 Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27, 2021, was 
commemorated with comments from Wolfgang Schäuble, the president of the Bundestag, 
who proclaimed that “the past is very much part of the present here.” Schäuble highlighted 
the anti-Semitic threat that has returned to Germany.264 
Nationalism has risen as a key topic in political debates; the far right has now taken 
ground using nationalistic biases, spreading fear of the Others and is popular among voters 
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today.265 One such right-wing populist group active in today’s Germany is Alternative fur 
Deutschland (AfD). The AfD’s platform is based on xenophobic sentiments emphasizing 
nationalism and past German glories.  
The party won over voters by emphasizing the Euro sovereign debt crisis and 
expressing xenophobic sentiments.266 The AfD is a strong performer in state elections and 
specifically in the former GDR.267 The AfD did well in the 2017 elections.268 It obtained 
12.6 percent of the vote in the national parliament and 92 seats in the Bundestag.269 
Germany diverged from those democratic virtues and aspirations of post-nationalism and 
no race hate, particularly toward Jews, by showing support for a blatantly anti-Semitic, 
nationalistic, and far right political party. Much of the support for the far right and the AfD 
party comes from states in the former East German side of the country, creating an East 
West divide in values again among the nation.270 
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As of March 2021, the AfD held 88 seats in the German Bundestag out of a total 
709 seats.271 The German government, as authorized under its constitution, placed the 
AFD under surveillance as of 2021 in taking steps to protect itself and its democracy, the 
first time such action has been taken in Germany’s postwar history.272 Courts have since 
blocked the surveillance as of March 2021, citing that the party is not a significant national 
security threat.273 
One of the most significant events bringing to light the modern German anti-
Semitic resurgence is a neo-Nazi group in the country called the National Socialist 
Underground (NSU). From 2000 to 2007, the NSU murdered ten people in several cities 
across the country.274 The killers shot their victims, the majority of whom were of Turkish 
descent, in execution style.275 The German authorities attributed these crimes initially to 
Turkish mafia turf wars, but as the killings continued through the years, they concluded 
that the neo-Nazi group was responsible, as the same gun, and later bombs, had been 
used.276 These neo-Nazi murderers, it was revealed, had a history of attending far-right 
band concerts and playing fantasy Jew killing games while wearing self-tailored SS 
uniforms.277 The group had three confirmed members but the investigation of the NSU 
indicated that around 100 may have belonged to the group’s support network, with more 
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than 20 of them admitting to supporting the group in the Munich trial.278 The group, with 
its many supporters confirms an underground culture of neo-Nazis within Germany who 
believe violence against minorities is their justified method of preserving German blood 
and soil nationalism.  
At the same time, curiously, much of the German population in the early to mid-
2000s found being Jewish, as well as being associated with anything Jewish, “trendy.”279 
The newly found enthusiasm for Jewish restaurants, cafes, cultural and religious 
reconstruction, and important historical sites, namely in the former East Berlin area, was 
part of a Jewish Renaissance. Tours of the area, denoted on maps as “Jewish Berlin,” were 
popular.280 
Yet acts of violence continued throughout the 2000s. In 2002, two Jewish women 
wearing Jewish symbolic jewelry were attacked in Berlin. A Jewish monument and Jewish 
graves in Dachau were destroyed. A synagogue attack was attempted in Berlin. Such acts 
brought anti-Semitism concerns back into the media spotlight.281 In 2003, a prominent 
Jewish man from Berlin expressed the idea that, for Jews living in Germany, “Abnormality 
is normality.”282 In 2005, a memorial was opened in Berlin, dedicated to the Murdered 
Jews of Europe.283 Amid the early years of the new millennium, as Peck explained, Jewish 
culture in Germany, especially in Berlin, seemed less exotic to many young Germans, yet 
not quite traditionally “the appropriate object of the ethnographic gaze.”284  
 In 2009, at the height of a refugee inflow into Europe, the American Jewish 
Committee (AJC) conducted a study that found overwhelmingly anti-Israeli and anti-
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Jewish attitudes among migrants from the Arab world.285 The statistic directly correlates 
with German Jewish community concerns about potential radicalization of a few 
refugees.286 The far right, latching onto the anti-Semitic tones outwardly expressed by a 
few immigrants, led to a large German domestic acceptance of anti-Semitism.  
To curb this disturbing trend, education pertaining to the Jewish communities in 
Germany, both inside and outside the country, is a vital part of efforts to decrease anti-
Semitism and stereotypes associated with these communities. Rent a Jew is a program 
created by the Jewish community in 2014 aimed at educating non-Jewish Germans on 
Jewish culture and history to assist in further cultural understanding.287 The program is 
composed of Jewish volunteers who talk about their lives and answer questions about their 
faith to break down stereotypes and prevent anti-Semitism in Germany.288 The effort is 
hopeful but even with the educational efforts, anti-Semitic violence persists.  
Although anti-Semitism is clearly seen in some refugees recently residing in 
Germany, and programs such as Rent a Jew, are trying to address the educational gap for 
the German youth, the re-emergence of anti-Semitism cannot be blamed on the immigrants 
alone, nor are the Jewish efforts enough to fight the systemic problem. Schools in Berlin 
were found to hold widespread anti-Semitic attitudes in a 2017 investigation conducted by 
AJC called “Salafism and Anti-Semitism in Berlin Schools.”289 One teacher expressed in 
an interview during the investigation that there is “a pronounced conflict between the 
religious ideas of some students on the one hand and the values of a democratic society on 
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the other.”290 The report explained that anti-Semitic attitudes “are so widespread that many 
Jewish students are leaving public schools due to bullying from peers. The phrase ‘You 
Jew’ is a common insult among students.”291 
In 2016, the murderous far-right lone survivor of the NSU stood trial for the racist 
neo-Nazi killings.292 The court case brought to light the systemic issues Germany is facing 
with the rise of the far right.293 The findings of the trial suggested that Germany, a nation 
priding itself on its ability to confront its dark past with unique diligence, nevertheless has 
a thriving underground right-wing extremist culture.294  
In 2018, a group of 12 neo-Nazis committed a significant anti-Semitic attack in the 
eastern German town of Chemnitz.295 The group graffitied a Jewish storefront with 
swastikas, smashed the store sign, and left a pig’s head with the star of David marked on 
its forehead.296 The attackers shouted, “Get out of Germany, you Jewish pig,” according 
to the 2018 U.S. Human Rights Report on Germany.297 The incident was one of more than 
1600 anti-Semitic crimes committed in Germany in 2018.298 The number of attacks 
increased by 20 percent from 2017, when Germany saw 1,420 anti-Semitic crimes.299 
Violent incidents increased by two-thirds from 2017 to 2018, worrying Felix Klein, 
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German Anti-Semitism Commissioner.300 Klein was appointed by the German 
government to head the commission after the drastic spike in anti-Semitic violence, mostly 
attributed to the Far Right, from 2017 to 2018.301 He stated in a Deutsche Welle interview 
that the spike was not surprising, and that the attacks should give Germans the impetus to 
“take preventative action soon.”302 He attributed the recurrence of anti-Semitism to the 
AfD party and not to Muslim immigrants, whom many Far Right supporters accused as the 
true perpetrators of the anti-Semitic violence.303 He also recognized that anti-Semitism 
was a growing concern across Europe, and he advocated for making anti-Semitism 
initiatives a priority for the EU.304 
In October of 2019, a far right extremist attempted to attack a synagogue on Yom 
Kippur, in Halle, Germany, killing two bystanders with explosives meant for the Jewish 
holy site.305 The attack was widely believed to be a result of growing anti-Semitism within 
Germany.306 Earlier in 2019, the German Jewish Council had already identified that anti-
Semitism was on the rise and warnings from the federal commissioner against anti-
Semitism urged Jews to avoid wearing their Kippahs in public for fear of further attacks or 
harassment.307 The Halle attack was the most serious anti-Semitic attack in post-
reunification Germany and served as further evidence that the trend of anti-Semitism was 
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rapidly growing within the country.308 The German foreign minister described anti-
Semitism as the largest threat to the country.309  
Marina Weisband, a Green Party member, criticized police forces in Germany for 
not doing enough to support and protect the Jewish community. A Jewish community 
member herself, she argued that the government projected the belief that there was no 
racism in the police.310 According to Weisband, a Minister President of Saxony, when 
questioned on the matter of providing more protection to German Jews, expressed that 
more police protection was not possible as the police were not able to respond to other 
citizen needs if the police must protect the Jews.311  
D. CONCLUSION 
In closing, Germany continues to struggle to come to terms with its violent history 
even as today, its ethnically biased society engages in an increasingly violent nationalistic 
discourse. As far-right attitudes gain legitimacy through political parties such as AfD, as 
traditionally democratic values are called into question, and as anti-Semitism and other 
ethnic biases become commonly accepted, it becomes clear that not only German but 
European security and security institutions are under threat, as is the overall project of 
spreading democracy within the region.312 
Germany, as a prominent and leading member of NATO and the EU, aspires to 
maintain the shared values of both organizations: a post-national Europe with a focus on 
equality and preservation of sovereignty. However, populist, and ethno-nationalist 
frameworks strain this goal, and anti-Semitism, among other forms of discrimination, 
significantly hinder combined efforts on foreign policy.313  
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NATO and the EU were founded on shared values of democratic multi-nationalism 
and liberalism that made it clear anti-Semitism would not be tolerated. The rise of anti-
Semitism in Germany in recent years poses a significant threat to the promises Germany 
herself helped forge in the aftermath of a catastrophic war borne of hatred of the Other. 
The younger generation’s embrace of German nationalism and anti-Semitism does not 
bode well for the future of the two supranational organizations and the mission and values 
that they represent. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
AND DEMOCRATIC REGIONAL CONSOLIDATION 
Poland and Germany are both similar and different in regard to the re-emergence 
of anti-Semitism within their countries, and these similarities and differences demonstrate 
a wider trend of undemocratic behavior across Europe. One of the issues is bilateral; Poland 
and Germany have a very close yet rocky relationship. Germany, starting in the mid-1990s, 
was one of the most influential advocates for Poland’s accession into the EU, as well as 
approving eastward enlargement all together.314 The two countries’ relationship today has 
weakened, negatively affecting the European project of integration. Poland and Germany 
have taken different paths in their respective responses to European policies. Poland’s 
government is looking for a more nationalistic way forward, while the German government 
is trying to hold together the European unity.315  
Poland is an enlargement member of both NATO and the EU, and as such, Poland 
differs from Germany significantly in the impact its democratic decline threatens to bring 
upon the supranational institutions. Poland was not forced into the agreements as was 
Germany and having model members of democracy assisting Poland in its quest to become 
a newer model democracy, Poland should be better at upholding the values. In other words, 
they learned from the rough drafts and proved to be a final product of what an ideal type 
of democracy could look like, and now with the PiS party in power, they have lost the 
sustainment of those values.  
Germany is an early member of both organizations, and if Germans allow their 
nation to spiral toward anti-democratic trends through anti-Semitism and other biases, 
NATO or the EU would likely be unable to withstand the country’s withdrawal. The ties 
between Germany and the other nations within both organizations form the stability in 
Europe.  
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The peace would not be guaranteed as it is today, and democracies would be left 
vulnerable to anti-democratic movements both internally and externally upon a collapse of 
the supranational structure. There is currently a mistrust between Poland and Germany that 
is worsening as their ideological values continue to drift apart, which prevents the EU and 
NATO from formulating common challenge responses.316 Anti-Semitic tendencies 
manifest in different ways in these two case study countries, but both Poland and Germany 
have the same underlying issue—trends toward anti-democratic racial and ethnic biases—
which are cause for concern in all states across Europe.  
The attacks in Würzburg and Ansbach in 2016 made the widespread and increasing 
anti-Semitism concerns more visible in the mainstream European scene, with more voices 
calling for recognition across Europe of this serious problem.317 In both Würzburg and 
Ansbach, the attacks one with an axe and the other through bombing, were described as 
lone-wolf attacks linked to the Islamic State and exacerbated heightened security fears 
across Europe, causing the fear of the Other to spike.318 
Democratic vulnerabilities stemming from a lack of basic human rights, where 
varying degrees of anti-Semitism are the catalyst for more violent forms of ethnic, 
religious, and ultimately anti-democratic acts among societies and governments in Europe, 
are clearly demonstrated and degrade the supranational institutions to which they belong. 
Specifically, the similarities and differences seen in the case studies of Poland and 
Germany, and the overall impact their cases of anti-Semitism are likely to play in the future 
of the supranational organizations, indicate a lack of willingness for these European states 
to uphold the fundamental values of their democracies.  
On one hand, Poland is undermining democratic values by committing human 
rights violations within its own borders with little to no regard for the reactions of its fellow 
NATO and EU member states. On the other hand, Germany is grounded in the need to hold 
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Europe together to ensure stability and security for the continent but has an underground 
of anti-Semitic and dissatisfied youth who see nationalism as their way forward. Despite 
these differences in overarching democratic value divergence, both countries have the same 
underlying problems, not dissimilar to their other NATO and EU member states. The 
problem is nationalism and populism among their societies, which display strong anti-
Semitism and show no rejections of hatreds and biases against minorities. In 2004, 
Rockwell Schnabel, American ambassador to the EU, claimed, amid the turmoil occurring 
during this time, that anti-Semitism throughout Europe was nearing the point it was in the 
1930s.319 Discriminations, still seen today, are forms of human rights violations that run 
directly contrary to the democratic values which all NATO and EU states pledged to 
uphold.  
A. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE POLISH CASE 
How far can Poland stray from the shared values of the collective without breaking 
ties with both organizations and at least rupturing its own relations with them? If Poland 
separates from the EU, the separation would have less of an impact on the EU’s continued 
existence, but Poland would lose much in terms of financial and trade-related advantages. 
If Poland were to exit NATO, the alliance would lose an advantaged footprint as a close 
steppingstone to Russia. Poland would be openly exposed to its largest threat—Russia—
who would surely take advantage of the vulnerable lone state. Poland benefits from NATO 
membership in three main ways: increased security and prestige of the Polish nation; the 
transformation of the Polish armed forces in technological modernization and 
professionalization, among other advantages; and infrastructure investments.320 
Another concern is seen in changes made by Poland’s PiS with regard to media 
censorship and intimidation similar to the communist-era fear influencing committed under 
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the Soviets.321 The ruling party has taken control of 40 out of 42 media outlets in Poland 
as of 2020.322 The anti-Semitism seen in the ruling government is a large part of this turn 
to authoritarianism. Adam Michnik expresses a fear of Poland’s media censorship as an 
all-out assault on the fundamental values of the EU, as he goes on to say, “Poland, together 
with a number of other countries in Europe, is witnessing a creeping authoritarian coup. 
The rule of law is being transformed into the rule of coterie of a single party.”323 Anti-
Semitism that effects the government’s behaviors can be seen in the current media 
restrictions fully supported by the PiS as they open a war on civil society and Polish 
democracy.324 The violation and the EU’s recognition of the issue is a clear indication that 
further tensions will have larger implications for Poland and in turn threaten the overall 
stability of the EU. Poland’s democratic decline is clearly seen through its disregard for 
the shared Western European values. Figure 2 provides a depiction of Poland’s decline 
after its successful democratic progression following the Cold War, now turning in this 
downward trend. The decline in democratic values and in turn, the increase of authoritarian 
rule within Poland started after the PiS’s election win in 2015 and has continually declined 
each year following.  
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Poland significantly declined starting after 2015, when the PiS took power. 
 Poland’s Democratic Decline325 
Polish democratic decline relative to other states in other Europe can be seen in 
Figure 3, where other well-known declining democracies see Poland following suit.  
 




From 2010 to 2020, Poland declined more sharply than other countries in terms of 
democratic consensus.  
 Democratic Decline Across Nations326 
As described by the Polish national defense government webpage, “For almost 70 
years, NATO has been the most important pillar of European security by providing a 
necessary link between Europe and North America in the political and defence sphere.”327 
Poland, being part of NATO for 21 years, has contributed to dozens of joint operations and 
has played vital roles in securing the Western European continent from threats like the 
Russian Federation and Islamic terrorists in the Middle East.328 Poland has boasted that it 
can and does provide the monetary requirements over most other NATO countries and is 
doing its part to contribute with hopes that in return, its fellow member states will back the 
country if ever they need the support.329 Poland fears Russia as its largest national threat; 
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this has been a longstanding fear and rightfully so, given Poland’s past contentious 
relationship with their large neighbor.330  
Fears aside, Poland demanded acceptance into NATO in the aftermath of the Soviet 
Union collapse and made clear its goals for the newly sovereign nation. The Prime Minister 
of Poland, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, explained in 1996 that “Poland is determined to 
contribute to collective efforts to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization 
of our peoples, founded on individual liberty and the rule of law.” 331 The initial stance 
was supported, according to Cimoszewicz, by 80 percent of the Polish population, and he 
added that Poland should contribute significantly to the security produced by NATO, not 
be a mere consumer.332 
The 1997 NATO Review expressed that “In joining NATO they [states aspiring for 
NATO membership] will join an Alliance not only firmly committed to cooperative 
relations, but also open to other democracies able and willing to pursue the common cause 
of security and stability in Europe.”333 It was very clear to Poland in its attempts to join 
NATO what the expectations of the deal would be. The U.S. Senate Executive Report from 
the 105th Congress stated, “The government [Poland] has been a strong supporter of human 
rights and civil liberties. The judiciary is independent, and freedom of the press is 
upheld.”334  
The initial push for democratic values has turned in recent years. There is a clear 
disconnect with the new generation of Poles and their outlook on what it means to be a 
NATO member state. Poland has initiated a divide in the EU, because they feel that the 
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U.S. will support them in a potential conflict over any of their European allies.335 The 
Polish view that European NATO members are unwilling to support them on military 
footing, coupled with Poland’s disregard for the union’s shared democratic values, has left 
both NATO and the EU in a state of internal contention.336 There will be no stability in 
Europe without upholding the shared values of the European democracies.  
As explained in a 2000 Harvard study, Poland is on the outer NATO fringe of the 
historically unstable border with the East, and with the re-emergence of great power 
competition, Poland is a key strategic player in contributing to the NATO alliance in future 
contention between Russia.337 It is in NATO’s and Poland’s best interest to continue the 
alliance.  
Poland joined the EU in 2002 after negotiations took place between Polish Prime 
Minister Miller and EU representatives, ending in its successful acceptance.338 If Poland 
turns to an authoritarian rule and breaks away from the EU, the country may find it difficult 
to sustain the relationships held in NATO as well. The scenario where Poland separates 
from the NATO alliance is possible, but given its greater fear of Russia, the likelihood of 
Poland willingly leaving NATO is far from realistic, as approximately 70 percent of Poles 
view their membership in NATO as directly improving Poland’s security.339 The 
xenophobic and antisemitic views that are a large source of contention between Poland and 
other members of NATO and the EU will be a more likely cause for concern. Should 
Poland ever need article 5 collective defense from allies, such support would likely be 
impacted by the states’ opinions on Poland’s aggressive authoritarian style under the PiS 
since 2015.  
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Since the PiS took office in November of 2015 with an overwhelming majority, the 
party and the EU have been at odds over issues concerning Poland’s Rule of Law.340 
Changes were made by the Polish parliament to the Constitutional Tribunal in December 
of 2015, and by January, the European Commission had already launched formal dialogue 
regarding their concerns with the Polish government.341 The Rule of Law issue in Poland, 
according to the European Commission, is that it puts the independence of the Polish 
judiciary and separation of powers at serious risk.342 Maintaining pluralism and non-
discrimination, tolerance and justice in the country are all critical democratic values to 
which the EU member states are required to uphold.343 Poland’s government’s reluctance 
to become more pluralistic in its religious and ethnic spheres has increased the narrow-
minded views; and its reluctance to take advice from fellow EU members, the Council, the 
Parliament, and non-governmental organizations, has not made it popular within the 
union.344 Officials from the EU identify parties such as Poland’s PiS as creating a false 
distinction between a sense of European community and of patriotism.345 In a speech given 
in September of 2018, Jean-Claude Juncker, the European Commission President, 
described unchecked nationalism as riddled with poison and deceit.346  
In some views, it can be argued that Poland’s government is moving to become 
more inclusive of the Jewish faith. A prime example of the state’s acceptance and support 
for the Jews is the Warsaw Hanukkah lighting ceremony, which has continued since the 
mid-2000s.347 The lighting event is highly publicized, and members of the Jewish 
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leadership from across the country, as well as city and state officials, participate.348 
Because the Jewish vote is inconsequential in the grand scheme of Polish politics, political 
participation in hopes of gaining Jewish votes cannot be said to be a motivating factor. 
Rather than promoting domestic unity, government officials seem more interested in 
attracting the attention of an international audience for the purpose of rebranding Poland 
abroad.349 Poland has been acutely aware that its image needs to be improved when it 
comes to diluting the dominance of Catholicism in the country.350 The visible marker is a 
perfect mechanism to make ideological differences materialize and undermine critical 
claims of Catholic uniformity.351 Items such as concerns over the rule of law in Poland 
and recent lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) exclusion zones, reminiscent of 
anti-Semitic exclusionary measures seen in Nazi Germany, leave more questions than 
answers on what the future for Poland will look like if the decline in democratic values 
continues.352 
Poland has seemingly lost the desire to mask the anti-democratic nationalism and 
anti-Semitism in its government. The clear use of anti-Semitic rhetoric by the ruling party, 
the exclusion zones for LGBT Poles, the Islamophobia without a significant Muslim 
population, the dismissal of rule of law issues among the Polish Judiciary, and the 
censorship of the Polish media all indicate Poland’s disregard for democratic values.  
It is in Poland’s best interest to reevaluate its status as a democratic society and 
make appropriate changes to retain the values it has sworn to protect. The need to 
strengthen ties with its allies is vital in maintaining peace within the region, and without a 
swift change to upholding these values, Poland will face alienation from allies and be left 
behind in the progressive open democracies of the world. By progressing from the ethnic 
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and religious homogeneity to an open and pluralistic society, governed in a manner to retain 
such values, it can once again become the example it was for aspiring democracies to 
emulate. Anti-Semitism is a central factor in mainstream Polish politics and society, and 
as the country becomes increasingly accepting of far-Right governance, which promotes 
manifestations of anti-Semitic origin, ethnic and religious discrimination will no doubt 
continue. 
B. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE GERMAN CASE 
Germany is shaped by its Nazi past in all aspects of its current national 
consciousness.353 Its pre-WWII military aggression and the Holocaust cast long shadows 
on the issues of today, and German demilitarization with a renunciation of war are key 
components in how postwar Germany established its democracy.354 These founding 
principles in the reestablishment of today’s Germany after reunification make it a 
seemingly sound and strong democratic state to emulate, but recent events have shown that 
threats of anti-democratic hatred have re-emerged in the form of younger German 
generations identifying with nationalism instead of the collective European framework. 
The very framework that has elevated Germany to the high standing it enjoys is being 
undermined by populist, anti-Semitic, and anti-democratic youth who contradict all that 
Germany has preserved and promoted for over 75 years.  
Germany was one of the six founding members of the steel and coal community 
that would eventually form the basis of the EU.355 The international group held 
commitments to uphold security through democratic union with European neighbors and 
unite European nations politically and economically to secure a lasting peace. The union, 
which then established the EU, between the Western nations of Europe, was vital for the 
German post-war recovery. Germany was an early member of NATO, and Germans used 
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the alliance to build back their legitimacy through mechanisms that anchored the German 
military institutions in the supranational framework of NATO and the EU.356  
If Germany removes itself from either of the two supranational organizations, it is 
unlikely that the system will survive. When the Federal Republic of Germany stood up and 
said no to hate, inequality, and helped to establish the rule-of-law requirements for the 
supranational system, as the successor of the Third Reich, its first significant action was to 
reestablish relations with Israel.357 As Thomas Berger explained, “After having initiated 
and lost two world wars which killed as many as 60 million people and ended in national 
partition and global opprobrium, German leaders feel constrained to demonstrate to 
domestic and foreign audiences that they have drawn the appropriate lessons from 
history.”358 But in recent times, these lessons seem to have slipped away from the younger 
German generations.  
With Germany’s AfD party rising in popularity, political dialogue poses questions 
about Germany’s future in the Schengen Agreement, EU Monetary Union, and the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Political goals.359 Nationalistic parties such as the AfD see 
Jews as cosmopolitan, working their way into societies to which they do not belong.360 
The notion of nationalism in countries joined together in the EU is difficult to comprehend 
considering the extent to which countries are now so interconnected on the economic, 
political, and social levels; dissolving the supranational states into national sovereignties 
would only lead to weaker and more fragile states. States feeling vulnerable to outside 
threats might well resort to war to assert their strength. German nationalism is especially 
difficult to comprehend, as popular opinion reflects an anti-war mindset; the notion of civic 
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nationalism, excluding Jews, and a more independent Germany seems counterproductive 
and irrational.361 
A generational shift in values is the issue most pressing in today’s Germany. The 
older generation, the so called 68ers and what are left of the 45ers have a broken 
relationship with Germany where Germanness is seen as distasteful and the need to forgive 
and forget in a sense was their way forward.362 Now the younger generation, who have not 
experienced the crimes of the Holocaust or have no direct links to the wartime tragedies, 
cannot understand the broken relationship of their parents and grandparents.363 The broken 
relationship causes confusion and also anger among them, where expressions of national 
pride belonging, and identity have been forbidden by their parents and the lack of 
understanding causes great strife between the young and the old.364 The idea of 
Germanness as racial rather than civic to many of the youth, while the previous generation 
pressed to integrate the civic definition into German thinking and mindset.365 The younger 
generation, according to Miller-Idriss, “no longer feels the pressure to force this national 
accountability onto the public agenda because for the younger generation, it’s totally clear 
that it’s different.”366 At what point will Germany’s youth-led nationalism conflict with 
the EU such that Germany can no longer abide by the value system it created? So many 
years after WWII and the vows of the “never again” generation, as those with experiences 
or memories of the Holocaust are aging and passing away, how can the youthful fever of 
anti-Semitic nationalism in a new Germany be broken? These are the questions for which 
scholars have no answer. Germany will either embrace the reality that nationalism is truly 
dead, an idea of past times which should never be revived, or it will press on in hopes of 
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regaining its national roots while subsequently destroying the nearly 77 years of peace seen 
in Europe since the end of WWII.  
Anti-Semitism among NATO member states as well as in aspiring members is 
perhaps the most urgent danger to the project of democracy in Europe because its trend of 
increasing acceptance is a direct threat to human rights. The acceptance of anti-Semitism, 
leading to human rights violations, inherently undermines the premise of a democratic state 
and the democratic values of a supranational institution. The nearly 77 years of peace in 
Europe since WWII has at times been tenuous; internal strife between member states has 
arisen, and tensions among the members related to external threats are also threats to the 
organizational core values within the member states themselves. The brand of Other in 
populist and nationalistic movements across Europe has proven that anti-Semitism, among 
other forms of racism, has re-emerged as a critical point of contention which has the 
potential to disrupt the shared value systems of these organizations.  
The majority of Germany’s population is certainly not anti-Semitic, but a majority 
who allows an anti-Semitic and anti-democratic minority to impose their will is all that is 
required for another catastrophe to occur in Europe. The promises Germany made 
following WWII are becoming undermined by the new generations of Germans pressing 
for their version of nationalism with its resurrection of anti-Semitism, and the potential that 
the silent majority will unwittingly enable the minority to end the promises the country 
made to NATO and the EU is real. The majority, or the approximately 80 percent who do 
not shut down the 20 percent, must speak up if this problem is to end.  
In conclusion, anti-Semitism is a subtle, ancient, and many times overlooked racial 
and religious hatred in Europe. It may be thought of as the canary in the coal mine, an 
indicator of looming disaster. As the case studies of Poland and Germany indicate, anti-
Semitism is a rising trend not only in these two countries but across Europe. Regardless of 
the amount of effort and emphasis governments place on upholding democratic values, 
anti-Semitism is a hatred that takes hold again and again. As long as there are those who 
accept and embrace hatreds and biases, who can publicly accept anti-Semitism after a 
catastrophic Jewish genocide, then they will likely be willing to adopt further prejudices 
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such as Islamophobia, xenophobia, anti-LGBT, anti-feminism, and others. In other words, 
another disaster may be looming. 
One recommendation presented in the literature is that pressure should be placed 
on Poland to advocate for minority rights and to support regional civil society.367 The 
recommendation is that the United States, NATO, and the EU should establish democratic 
expectations for Poland, with accountability governance through the rule of law and the 
established democratic norms, in order to maintain European stability and continued 
partnerships.368 This study gives an endorsement of the prescribed recommendation but 
would include among these expectations and measures not just the rule of law issues, but 
the human rights violations stemming from anti-Semitism and other biases.  
A recommendation for how the United States, NATO, and the EU should face the 
issues seen in Germany will be more challenging to formulate. Germany needs its fellow 
EU members to remain in good democratic standing to hold together the union that is so 
vital to the German economy, non-military interventionist attitudes, and its current way of 
life. Germany must continue, alongside the United States and fellow member states, to 
advocate for democratic values and call for all citizens within the EU, regardless of 
nationality, to rebuke anti-Semitism and all manifestations of hate and bias that undermine 
the unified democratic values and bolster the need for a unified Europe to ensure security 
and stability in the region.  
With Europe’s vow to “Never Again” allow fascism, anti-Semitism, and 
discrimination on the continent, far right ideologies, most notably fascist rhetoric undercut 
the nearly 80 years of efforts to fight against such oppressive and hateful convictions.369 
The need for monitoring stations and Respect Diversity programs after the clear atrocities 
conducted in WWII, condemned by NATO and the EU, identify a clear re-emergence of 
anti-Semitism, and with it, fascist ideologies to which pose dangers for not just Jews but 
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all minority populations and the foundation of the pillars of security and stability in 
Europe.370  
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